






Religion versus Ethnicity as a Source of 











MICROCON Research Working Paper 18 
Frances Stewart 

















Correct citation: Stewart, F. 2009. Religion versus Ethnicity as a Source of 
Mobilisation: Are There Differences? MICROCON Research Working Paper 18, 
Brighton: MICROCON. 
 
First published in 2009 
© Frances Stewart 2009 
ISBN 978 1 85864 901 3 
 
For further information, please contact: 
MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict, Institute of Development 
Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE 
Tel: +44 (0)1273 872891 
Email: info@microconflict.eu 












MICROCON Research Working Paper 18  
October 2009 
 
Abstract: The root causes of most violent conflicts lie in economic and political 
factors, often horizontal inequalities of various types. Yet people are organised, united 
and mobilised by identities, in particular ethnic or religious ones.  Most conflict 
analyses treat religion as a subset of ethnicity. This paper explores differences 
between these two identities, both by reviewing literature and by analysis of some 
recent surveys of perceptions in a number of conflict-affected countries.  It finds 
many similarities in mobilisation, with both identities used instrumentally by leaders, 
but both ‘essentialised’ and ‘believed in’ by those who are mobilised. Yet in both 
cases, leaders have to cultivate the identity of those mobilised, and that of the ‘other’, 
to induce violence on any scale. Religious organisation and external support are often 
stronger than in the case of ethnicity, but there is no evidence that religious conflicts 
are more deadly than ethnic ones.  Preliminary evidence suggests that in the many 
cases where both identities are present and overlapping, the identity along which 
mobilisation occurs is determined by demographics and according to the identity 
which is perceived as being used politically in the allocation of government jobs and 
contracts.  The need for both religious and ethnic leaders to work at mobilisation for 
some time preceding a conflict gives rise to possibilities of monitoring and 
intervention to prevent conflict occurring.  
 
                                                  
1 A version of this paper has also appeared as CRISE Working Paper No. 70. 
2 Professor of Development Economics and Director of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human 





On the face of it, the answer to the question posed by the title of this paper seems 
rather obvious: in one case, people are fighting with divine sanction and support, in 
the other on the basis of rather arbitrary differences in language, history etc. This is 
the view of (Juergensmeyer 1993), who claims that religion fosters stronger loyalty 
and commitment than other identities, while Hoffman argues that for religious 
warriors, ‘Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are 
thereby unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constraints that seem to 
affect other terrorists’(Hoffman 1993). Yet others have claimed that the religious label 
is just a label under which people fight, and performs the same instrumental function 
of uniting and mobilising people as ethnic distinctions based on language or history – 
it is one among a number of cultural markers that together define ethnicity (Seul 
1999). Economists have argued that religion develops and is used instrumentally to 
prosecute war in much the same way as others have analysed ethnicity’s role in 
conflict instrumentally (Iannaccone and Berman 2006 on religion; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2000 on ethnicity). Indeed, many analyses classify religion either as one 
ethnic marker, or put ‘religious or ethnic’ groups in the same category.  Moreover, to 
complicate issues, many conflicts have both ethnic and religious dimensions. This 
paper aims to explore this debate; to identify similarities and differences, and if there 
do seem to be differences, what they are and what implications they have for the 
nature of war and for its prevention. 
 
It is sometimes suggested that there are two alternative and exclusive explanations of 
the many violent conflicts (mainly within countries) that we observe today: that either 
they are cultural or ‘civilisational’ as Huntington suggested (Huntington 2002); or 
they have political  and/or economic motivations, which  may be individual or group-
based. This is a false dichotomy. Clearly, cultural differences alone are insufficient to 
cause violent conflict, given the large number of peaceful multicultural societies 
(Cohen 1974; Fearon and Laitin 1996). Hence the many socio-economic and political 
explanations of conflict. Among these are horizontal inequalities (inequalities among 
culturally defined groups), a failure of the state to provide social services or security, 
large numbers of unemployed youths (often semi-educated), low incomes and 
environmental pressures, and rent-seeking activities associated with high levels of  
3 
 
natural resources (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and 
World Bank. 2003; Gurr 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994; Horowitz 1985; Humphreys 
2005; Stewart 2008b). There is empirical evidence indicating that each of these 
explanations has some validity. 
 
Yet those who look to socio-economic or political motives alone also find them 
insufficient because, however strong the motive, collective or group organisation 
forms an essential element in political mobilisation for violent conflict. While the 
underlying predisposing condition which makes violent conflict likely may be 
horizontal inequality, in both political and socio-economic dimensions, and/or the 
presence of high-value natural resources, people have to be mobilised if conflict is 
actually to break out. And such collective organisation and mobilisation generally 
requires some unifying mission or identity which is sufficiently powerful to get 
people to kill and be killed on a large scale. Material motives and forced conscription 
can and do play a role of course, but these are frequently subordinate. ‘Forced’ joiners 
seem usually to be a minority and those who join are often paid little, sometimes 
nothing.  In many cases, in addition to the underlying grievance, it is the unifying 
mission which inspires those who fight. Indeed, the grievance itself generally depends 
on a perceived difference in the economic and/or political position of groups and 
some keenly felt identity difference is thus a defining aspect of the grievance as well 
as being an essential aspect of mobilisation. Motives are mixed, as always, and status, 
security, money and politics – especially for leaders – are usually present as well as 
the difference in felt identity or mission. Moreover, in addition to providing a 
powerful motive, a common identity is also important to produce trust among the 
fighters, which is essential for the efficient prosecution of any conflict. 
 
During the Cold War a predominant mission was provided by ideology:  people 
identified themselves as pro-West and capitalist or pro-Soviet Union and socialist or 
Marxist, especially in the wars by proxy in central Africa (Angola and Mozambique), 
Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia) and Latin America (Guatemala, Nicaragua and 
El Salvador).  Nonetheless, although presented as class and ideological wars, there 




3 However, as has been widely observed, cultural identities appear to have 
become more important as a source of mobilisation in recent decades, and ideology 
less so (Hechter 2004; Huntington 1996; Huntington 2002).  These cultural 
differences encompass a wide range of phenomena: ‘racial’ differences; ‘ethnic’ 
differences; ‘clan’ differences; ‘religious’ differences; and differences between 
‘religious sects’.  The inverted commas are used to indicate that each concept is 
problematic. In many analyses, the various differences are all encompassed in the 
broad term ‘ethnic’. For example, Horowitz states: 
 
‘Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, whether the indicum is color, 
appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some 
combination thereof’ (Horowitz 1985: 17; my italics).  
 
Sambanis (2001) uses Horowitz’ definition in his contrast between ethnic and non-
ethnic civil wars, the former encompassing religious and ethnic differences and the 
latter ideological motives (revolutionary wars). Hechter (2004) similarly argues that 
the move away from class politics to culture incorporates both religion and ethnicity, 
without making any particular distinction between the two, as we, too, did in our book 
on horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2008b). Kalyvas (2008) also refers only to ethnic 
and non-ethnic wars. 
 
This paper, in contrast, aims to differentiate between religion and ethnicity as 
identities around which people mobilise and to consider whether there are important 
differences between the two, as sources of mobilisation, and in the likely 
consequences for the nature of conflicts and for policy approaches.  In doing so I shall 
continue to use ethnicity rather broadly to encompass differences in ‘colour, 
appearance, language’ as well as other indicators, such as common histories, which 
are felt as sufficiently important shared characteristics to be potential sources of 
mobilisation. Ethnic difference will be assumed to include what might be thought of 
as subdivisions of a particular ethnicity (‘clans’) if these become important enough to 
be a source of mobilisation. Since the differences that go to constitute an ethnic group 
are a matter of perceptions and felt salience as much as ‘objective’ features, the 
                                                  
33 Kalyvas (2008: 15) has described this as ‘the blend of Marxism-Leninism and ethnic mobilization 
exemplified by Cold War national liberation movements’.  
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boundaries may be quite fluid, changeable, and apparently arbitrary, subject to 
influence by the educational system, the media and leaders – in other words, 
‘constructed’.  Yet, as Turton (1997) pointed out,  ‘the very effectiveness [of 
ethnicity] as a means of advancing group interests depends upon its being seen as  
“primordial” by those who make claims in its name’.  
 
As far as religion is concerned, this paper is concerned with globally ‘organised’ 
religions rather than more amorphous bodies of belief like animism (though some 
have well-structured local organisation). And, as with ethnicity, I shall include 
subdivisions (or sects) as well as broad religious divisions in so far as they are the 
salient sources of mobilisation – which of course is often the case.  
 
There remains a difficulty about categorising conflicts into ‘religious’ and ‘ethnic’ 
types: first, there is the question of how far the objectives of a conflict have to be 
solely (or in large part) ethnic or religious to categorise the conflicts in this way.  For 
example, Hoffman (2006) suggests that some conflicts are not really religious because 
of the pre-eminence of political rather than religious motivation. Gurr (1993) takes a 
similar view arguing that religion is rarely the root cause of conflict. Here I take a 
different approach: while all conflicts have several motives with political and/or 
economic ones generally central, mobilisation frequently occurs on the basis of 
particular identities, and conflicts can then be classified as ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’, or 
class or ideological, on the basis of how people are mobilised rather than with respect 
to the political or economic motives for such mobilisation.  Consequently, here 
conflicts will be classified as ethnic or religious according to their main organising 
identity, irrespective of the ‘true’ underlying motives and objectives.
4 A second 
serious problem about classifying conflicts into religious or ethnic is that there is quite 
often ambiguity as to whether mobilisation is by religion or ethnicity, where religious 
and ethnic distinctions overlap.  Whether a conflict is predominantly religious or 
ethnic may then be difficult or even impossible to determine. It may be helpful then to 
have a threefold distinction between ‘religious’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘mixed’ conflicts.  For 
                                                  
4 Here I share the view of Seul (1999) who argues that ‘religious conflicts’ need not be about religion 
or religious conversion, and indeed usually have non-religious causes. They are so called because this 
is the unifying and mobilising identity. ‘Religion is not the cause of ‘religious conflict; rather for 
many… it frequently supplies the fault line along which intergroup identity and resource competition 
occurs’ (Seul 1999: 564).    
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these cases, Ruane and Todd (2009) suggest a matrix allowing for varying 
combinations of degrees of group solidarity on the basis of ethnicity and on the basis 
of religion.  
 
Although, in this paper, I am concerned with identities as sources of mobilisation, this 
does not mean that I have abandoned the view that the fundamental causes of conflict 
are usually political or socio-economic, and not a clash of cultures alone
5; nor am I 
denying the obvious and well-established fact that people join fighting forces for a 
variety of material motives. Indeed, among the issues which need to be investigated 
(though not in this paper) is whether conflicts with similar socio-economic and 
political cause have a different impact in the presence of ethnic as against religious 
identity differences. Moreover, the nature of the political and economic causes, and 
particularly the nature and extent of horizontal inequalities, may itself be a factor in 
causing or accentuating the salience of particular identities.
6  This is supported by the 
perceptions survey evidence presented in Section 4.  
 
The next section of this paper will present a general discussion on what differences 
one might expect between mobilisation on the basis of religious identity and that on 
the basis of ethnic identity, drawing on some secondary empirical evidence. This is 
followed by a discussion of some implications for the nature of conflicts arising from 
different bases for mobilisation. Section 4 explores why people adopt one identity 
rather than another for political mobilisation, with evidence drawn from perceptions 
surveys conducted by the Centre for Research on inequality, Human Security and 
Ethnicity (CRISE).  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an initial overview and come to some preliminary 
conclusions on the basis of this evidence, which need to be tested by further research. 
The final section suggests some research questions and some possible policy 
implications.  
 
2. Some apparently obvious differences and some similarities 
  
                                                  
5 See Stewart (2008b). 
6 Cultural status inequalities, in particular, may contribute to the rise in the salience of a group.  
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The discussion will be organised around four elements: 
 
1.  group formation; 
2.  the nature of mobilisation for conflict, distinguishing between leaders or 
mobilisers and those who are mobilised; including treatment of the ‘other’; 
3.  organisation, training and sources of support; 
4.  implications for the nature of conflicts. 
 
2.1 Group formation 
 
There is a huge literature on what ethnic identities are, how they are formed and so 
on. Views range from a primordial one – that ethnic differences are somehow innate 
to people, rigid and unchangeable – to social constructivist approaches, whereby such 
identities are ‘constructed’ through historical social processes, influenced, and 
sometimes manipulated, by leaders for instrumental political objectives. According to 
some variants of the latter view, identities are not just (or sometimes at all) self-
constructed but categories whose boundaries may largely be decided by others, 
generally for the purpose of protecting privileges (for example, the racial categories of 
apartheid South Africa, or the Hutu/Tutsi distinction in Belgian-ruled Rwanda and 
Burundi).  Within broad ethnic categories, subdivisions may emerge or gain 
importance over time, or groups may coalesce, often for political purposes. 
Consequently, the salience of ethnicity and ethnic boundaries can vary over time. 
Moreover, ethnic group boundaries are not usually tight or well defined and are 
blurred by migration and cross-cultural marriages.  Yet one can trivialise what seems 
to be very important felt distinctions, by placing too much emphasis on the 
constructed nature of the distinctions. Luos and Kikuyus, Akan and Ewe, Igbo and 
Hausa, to take a few examples, see strong distinctions in their identities – so strong 
that they can sometimes lead to conflict. But it is also important to note that the 
importance (and recognition) of ethnic categorisations can vary sharply within a group 
as well as over time.  In terms of potential for mobilisation, this means that (a) those 
who wish to mobilise people may first need to increase the consciousness of group 
identities (and of the identities of others, see below); and (b) there are likely to be 
strong variations in response among those with the particular identity. An important 
research issue is the determinants of such responses (and here, particularly, the precise  
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economic and psychological position of ‘respondees’ is relevant). For example, the 
majority of the population in the U.S. are white, but white supremacists are supported 
by only a small minority of this majority.  
 
An important factor which may determine which identities are salient, and may 
accentuate particular group boundaries and divisions, is the nature and extent of 
horizontal inequalities: if a group is excluded from political power and marginalised 
economically, then group consciousness is likely to rise; and, indeed, disparate 
subgroups may be brought together under a common identity to protest more 
effectively: examples are the ‘unification of diverse ethnic identities into a broader 
“Bangsamoro” identity in the mainly Muslim Mindanao region of the Southern 
Philippines’ (Brown and Langer 2008: 7); and the case of the Orange Asli, where a 
single identity was forged to encompass a number of aboriginal peoples of Malaysia, 
who are very different in terms of appearance and culture and united to gain more 




Turning to religion, while religion itself may be argued to be a social construct, it is a 
very formal one and categorisation of people by religion would seem to be less 
problematic than by ethnicity.  Many people are formal members of particular 
religious organisations; others attend ceremonies or rituals of one particular religion 
periodically. Within the dominant global religions, subdivisions have emerged over 
time, generating new organisational structures and changed beliefs and rituals 
(Catholic or Protestant, Shia or Sunni, for example).  The subdivisions in turn have 
bred other subdivisions. Of course, there is some ambiguity ‘at the edges’, especially 
in largely secular societies, where, e.g. in the UK ‘C. of E.’ is a label given to people 
in hospital if they declare no specific religion.  Although cross-religious marriages 
also occur, it seems they are less prevalent than cross-ethnic marriages (see the 
evidence from the perceptions surveys below), and children normally choose (or are 
allocated to) one religion rather than the other, and rarely claim adherence to both 
religions (indeed this is not permitted by most religious organisations). There is a 
marked difference here with respect to non-formal traditional religions, which often 
                                                  
7 Marianna Volpi, CRISE DPhil student: personal communication.  
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do seem to be adhered to simultaneously with adherence to the more formal religions. 
In general, however, there is less ambiguity about group boundaries in religion than in 
ethnicity. But because of the huge array of sects and subsects, there are choices with 
respect to which group, subgroup or coalition of groups to use as a basis for 
mobilisation, just as with ethnic mobilisation. And, as with ethnicity, not everyone 
within a particular religion is potentially ‘mobilisable’, rather there is a spectrum of 
potential; as with ethnicity, the personal circumstances of the members will play an 
important role here, which may be (but is not necessarily) related to the degree of 
religious fervour of the person.  Again whether a group faces relative deprivation is 
likely to be one determinant of the salience of the identity. 
 
People have multiple identities, among which both religion and ethnicity are often 
important components.  For example, the CRISE perceptions surveys (to be discussed 
more in Section 4) showed that ethnicity was perceived to be one of their three most 
important identities by between 16 per cent (Guatemala) and 50 per cent (Malaysia) of 
people in the seven countries in which we conducted surveys; if we add ethnicity and 
place of origin, we find the ratio varies between 41 per cent and 87 per cent (same 
countries).  Religion was perceived as a more pervasive identity, however, being 
among the three most important aspects of identity for 78 per cent of people in 
Nigeria and 76 per cent in Malaysia and Ghana, while the lowest proportion was 
Bolivia at 30%. In every country, many people cited religion and ethnicity as 
important aspects of their identity, ranging from 12 per cent of respondents in Ghana 
to 37 per cent in Malaysia.  
 
There is a strong tendency, for historic reasons, for religious and ethnic affiliations to 
overlap in many countries – for example, in Nigeria, Northern Hausa-Fulani are also 
Muslims, while Southern ethnic groups are mainly Christian; in Malaysia there is a 
near one-to-one correspondence between being Malay and being Muslim, although 
some Indians are also Muslim; in the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs are predominately 
Eastern orthodox Christians, the Croats Catholics and the Bosnians Muslims.  
 
Where there is such an overlap, it may not be clear whether people are mobilised 
primarily according to their religion or their ethnicity – this is the case, for example in  
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the conflicts in central Maluku, Indonesia, the central belt in Nigeria and the former 
Yugoslavia and the long civil war in Sri Lanka.  
 
In Maluku, the conflict started as tension between indigenous Ambonese and migrants 
to Ambon; the migrants were Muslim (though there were some indigenous Muslims) 
and the locals were Christian and the conflict soon acquired  a strong religious 
dimension, with attacks on Mosques and Churches, and with each party fearing that 
the other intended to make the state Muslim/Christian (Bhakti et al. 2009; Stern 
2003).  
 
‘The problem of social inequality, competition over natural resources, and 
disputes between political elites and bureaucrats underpinned the conflict, but 
some discourses distorted the causes of the violence, portraying it as a 
religious conflict… By May 1999, the conflict in Central Maluku had settled 
down, until the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in Maluku, 
dominated by Christian leaders, won the election. Dissatisfaction with this on 
the part of the Muslim community led to a re-escalation of the conflict in June 
1999. Religion became a crucial issue during this period. Property in Maluku 
was destroyed and lives lost. Each side defended their own faith, regardless of 
whether their own relatives of different religions were targeted in attacks.   
(Bhakti et al. 2009: 23). 
 
In central Nigeria, religion has been the framing identity in recent conflicts (broadly 
coinciding with ethnic distinctions), with religious leadership and religious symbols 
attacked.  While there are political and economic motives, fear of the introduction of 
sharia law has given Christians a powerful reinforcing motive, both sides being 
encouraged by ideas and finance from outside (with Pentecostals influenced (broadly) 
by American Baptist churches and ‘salafi’ ideas taken from Islamic reform 
movements: Higazi 2009; Last 2007).    
 
In the former Yugoslavia, what started as nationalistic/ethnic motivation took on 
religious dimensions, with the use of religious symbols and targets (Dunn nd; Shenk 
1993) although it has been argued that this was more a way of defining 
nationalism/ethnicity than important in itself (Powers 1996). In Côte d’Ivoire, the  
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fundamental issue during the recent conflict was that of citizenship (Ivoirité), which 
hinged on immigrant status, but the division between locals and immigrants was also 
religious (Christian and Muslim respectively) and some people presented the conflict 
as a religious one (Nordäs 2007; Langer 2005). 
 
The case of Sri Lanka illustrates how, with overlapping identities, different identities 
can become salient according to political circumstances: 
 
Religion closely overlaps with ethnicity in Sri Lanka, and to some extent, 
religious identity forms the core of ethnic identity.  Before colonialism and 
Christian proselytization, to be Hindu was by definition to be Tamil and vice 
versa.  To be Buddhist was to be Sinhalese and vice versa.  Since the 17th 
century, about 10 per cent of the Tamil and Sinhalese populations have been 
converted to Christianity.  However, even today, Buddhist religious identity 
remains a very strong element in the Sinhalese identity, and efforts to 
institutionalise Buddhism are strongly resented by Tamils.  For example, 
Buddhist monks are typically very strongly Sinhala nationalist and anti-
Tamil.
8   
 
During the colonial period, religious identity was a source of serious sectarian 
strife, particularly between Sinhalese Buddhists and Sinhalese Christians, and 
there are reports of sporadic violence between the two groups.  Basically, 
Buddhists resented the aggressive proselytization of Christian missionaries, 
and the favouritism of the colonial state towards the church.  Some of this was 
the hangover from bitter memories of forced conversion and violent 
suppression of Buddhists and all non-Catholics during the Portuguese period. 
 
Having said that, by the mid-20th century, ethnicity, rather than religion 
became the most important marker of political identity in Sri Lanka.  It wasn't 
really the LTTE that 'chose' ethnicity over religion.  The salience of ethnicity 
had already been established well before they were created, and people already 
                                                  
8 A further group are Sri Lankan Muslims, who are considered a separate ethnic group and a separate 
religious group.  They share the language of Tamils but have fought for separate classification as an 
ethnic group.  
12 
 
identified themselves in these terms.  For the most part, this occurred during 
the colonial period.  Many would say that the salience of ethnicity was a 
creation of the colonial administration and they way in which they understood 
native society and the ways they sought to categorise it for administrative 
purposes, reinforced for example, by the way in which data was collected for 
census purposes, and in the way that 'native representatives' were sought out. 
 
As a result, when electoral politics came into being in the 1930s, the dominant 
axes of competition were already pre-set in ethnic rather than religious terms, 
although religion (and caste, region, etc) also came to play an important part of 
the sub-text.  People in Jaffna identified themselves vis-a-vis the rest of the 
country as Tamils, and voted for Tamil parties that explicitly sought to 
represent the sectional interests of the Tamil ethnic group.
9  
 
In other cases, in contrast, there is little or no overlap between ethnic and religious 
identities: in Ghana, there are many Christians as well as Muslims among Northern 
ethnic groups, though Southerners are mainly Christian; in Latin America, most 
people, of all ethnicities, are Christian with some important subdivisions; in the 
Congo, Rwanda, Angola and Mozambique salient identity differences are ethnic and 
not religious. And at a global level, the major religions cover many ethnicities. Hence 
while the presumption might be that it would be easier to mobilise people for conflict 
where there is strong overlap in religious and ethnic identities, since there will be 
fewer interactions across ethnicity/religion (Blau 1977; Simmel and Simmel 1955) 
and both religious and ethnic identities may be called on, the effective global 
mobilisations (Christian historically; and Muslim today) as well as those in many 
contemporary civil conflicts (e.g. within the Congo) question this presumption. In the 
first category, people have been effectively mobilised under a single umbrella despite 
many ethnic differences; and in the second, people of the same religion have been 
mobilised into conflicting groups along ethnic lines. 
 
Yet even where the differences are not religious, religion may be used to justify 
mobilisation: for example, in Rwanda, Christians visionaries ‘predicted’ a blood bath 
                                                  
9 Rajesh Venugopal, CRISE Research Officer, personal communication, January 2009.  
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and implicitly claimed that the Virgin Mary had approved it, while parts of the Church 
were actively complicit (Gourevitch 1998). 
 
The relationship between both ethnicity and religion and politics is a complex one. In 
many contemporary interpretations, neither ethnicity nor religion is generally viewed 
as being centrally concerned with politics; ethnicity encompasses a way of life – 
language, customs, behaviour relating to every day living – while religion is 
interpreted as being primarily concerned with people’s relationship with God.
10 With 
this view, both may need a certain amount of conversion, or politicisation, to make 
them political instruments. Yet historically, there has been deep political involvement 
of both types of identity. In the case of ethnicity, colonial powers commonly 
politicised ethnicity by using ethnic difference in administrative processes, as shown 
above in the case of Sri Lanka; this applied in general to African colonial 
administrations, which have been argued to be the origin of some of the sharp 
contemporary ethnic distinctions (Ranger 1983); in addition, ethnic associations 
frequently emerged to protect a groups’ resources and customs against other ethnic 
groups and/or against the state (Cohen 1969; Horowitz 1985; Ranger 1983).  In the 
case of religion, the extensive influence and control of religious organisations over 
adherents’ behaviour inevitably leads to politicisation, with religious organisations 
either collaborating with the state or coming into conflict with it; the deeply political 
role of religion is perhaps clearest where a particular religion is recognised as the state 
religion (in about a quarter of countries today) – in these cases it is impossible to 
differentiate between state and religion.
11  Examples of the politicisation of religion 
abound: missionary activities in colonial societies and Islamic Caliphates; the 
Crusades; many civil wars, such as that in 16th and 19th-century Europe and 17th-
century Britain.  Nonetheless, since the prime purpose of religious organisation is not 
political, the extent of politicisation varies across organisations and situation. 
 
In summary, both ethnicity and religion are widely shared identities, which may 
potentially be called on to mobilise for political purposes, including for violent 
conflict. Group categorisation is less formal and clear cut in the case of ethnicity and 
                                                  
10 Though the idea that religion is a personal matter rather than a social or political one is a recent 
Western conception (Deneulin and Bano 2009).  
11 Of course, what it means in practice for a religion to be ‘established’ varies hugely.  
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may therefore need more ‘work’ to become an effective source of mobilisation – but 
this depends on history; the activities of previous agents, and events, may have 
created strong group consciousness. In each case, strong horizontal inequalities and 
perceived favouritism or discrimination by the government is likely to enhance the 
salience of a particular identity, as shown in the Sri Lankan case.  But it is important 
to reiterate that in a quite large number of cases, strong overlaps in the two types of 
identity may make classification of conflicts into either ethnic or religious types 
problematic. 
 
Two features may help determine which identity is the salient one from the 
perspective of mobilisation where both form potential dividing lines:  first, whether 
political favouritism or discrimination and socio-economic inequalities occur most 
strongly along ethnic or religious lines, since where there are strong inequalities and 
discrimination, this will tend to politicise the identity and encourage mobilisation. 
This issue will be investigated further in Section 4. Secondly, ‘demographics’ or the 
number and relative size of the groups, may influence how people mobilise. Where 
there is a large number of small groups (e.g. of different ethnicities), effective 
mobilisation along ethnic lines may prove difficult and some overarching identity may 
be needed, which might be a new uniting ethnic identity, or a shared religious one. 
Taking this argument seriously, Iannacone and Berman (2006) have suggested that 
encouraging the multiplication of religious sects would help prevent religious. 
 
2.2. Mobilising for conflict 
 
Here I wish to differentiate those who actively mobilise and those who are mobilised. 
Both categories are rather loose. First, on the side of the mobilisers (or what, for 
shorthand, I shall call ‘leaders’) many people may start in a subordinate position (as 
‘mobilisees’) but then take on leadership roles. Moreover, there are leaders at many 
levels: ‘a leader can be defined as some semi-literate preacher or imam in a small 
village who might manage to win the confidence of … a couple of dozen people, to a 
sheikh who commands the respect of potentially millions of people. Yet in the village 
where the fighting is happening the sheikh might not have much relevance, ensconced  
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as he is in a large city mosque or headquarters’.
12 Secondly, on the side of the 
mobilisees (or ‘followers’), there is a spectrum of mobilisation: at one extreme are the 
totally committed, the most committed being suicide fighters, followed by regular 
active agents of violence; but then there is a range of non-fighting supporters, 
including organisers, suppliers, families who provide active support for fighters and 
those who look on with passive approval (Justino 2008; Stern 2003). Without going 
into the nuances within each category, we might expect the so-called leaders and the 
followers to have somewhat different motivations. 
 
2.2.1 Motives of leaders 
 
On the side of the leaders, there are typically strong political motives (to gain power, 
or to avoid losing it) and there may also be immediate material motives (from illicit 
wartime activities), which may grow as mobilisation and violence develop.  It seems 
clear that in most cases, declared ethnic or religious objectives are used instrumentally 
by leaders to gain support for these other objectives. Yet this leaves undetermined the 
question of whether leaders have intrinsic ethnic or religious motives and how strong 
they are, and whether this differs between ethnic and religious leaders. Below I try to 
analyse these questions briefly, but clearly more careful research is needed. 
 
It is of course impossible to know true motives as what is said is inevitably part of the 
effort to mobilise followers, and consequently might be viewed purely instrumentally.   
Nonetheless, many rebel leaders take risks and, initially at least, suffer material losses.  
As a first approach, it is worth listening to what leaders say: here I draw first on some 
statements by ethnic leaders and then by religious ones.  
 
First, is Frederick Fasehun, leader of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), an 
important Yoruba militia in Nigeria, drawing on material collected by Yvan 
Guichaoua (Guichaoua 2006).  The OPC was founded in 1994 with explicitly ethnic 
motives. It was founded in reaction to the Nigerian military’s annulment of the 
elections which had been won by a prominent Yoruba, Abiola, in 1993. Fasehun 
commented on the situation: 
                                                  




‘It was then I decided to gather the youths who are quite able to flex their 
muscles because, if it was what is required, why not’. (Interview with Yvan 
Guichaoua, 02/06/05). He believed that  ‘The Yoruba are no longer considered 
disfavoured second-class citizens but have become enemies that must be 
hounded into exile, haunted into detention, humiliated, dehumanised, and 
marked to be wiped off the surface of Nigeria’ (Fasehun 2002: 147). 
 
 
The fundamental objectives of the OPC as laid out in its constitution are: 
 
to identify with our historical and cultural origin with a view to reliving the 
glory of our past for the purpose of posterity; to educate and mobilise the 
descendants of Oduduwa for the purpose of the above; to integrate the 
aspirations and values of all the descendants of Oduduwa into a collective 
platform of an Oodua entity; to … struggle for the protection of these interests; 
… to further the progress of Oodua civilization by protection and promoting 
our value, mores and the intergenerational transmission of same (Human 
Rights Watch 2003: 4, quoted in Guichaoua 2006). 
 
 
It is not possible to be sure, as Guichaoua points out, how far Fashun genuinely 
believed in the ethnic-oriented ideas of the OPC, or simply thought (correctly) that 
they would be effective in mobilisation. However, it is clear that for him the path was 
a risky one with low immediate rewards in either money or security. Indeed, in 1996, 
he was arrested and it was in reaction to this that the movement became violent. As 
time went on, and the OPC’s membership and its economic and criminal activities 
expanded, its leaders undoubtedly gained more material and status rewards, and the 
role of ethnicity in their motivation probably lessened (Guichaoua 2006). The origin 
of the OPC thus lay in attack on the Yoruba people from outside (the government), 
according to this account. This seems a common initial impetus, which gives the 
group more than purely instrumental status – if the identity is under attack then its 
preservation (and protection of members) becomes an important objective for group  
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leaders as well as followers. In Rwanda, similarly, Hutu leaders feared loss of power 
as a result of attack particularly from the Tutsi rebels in Uganda. 
 
Yet it is not possible to know whether the black propaganda used to mobilise people is 
believed by those who promulgate it, or merely a strategy to achieve power.  In the 
case of the ethno-religious wars in the former Yugoslavia, most observers seem to 
believe that the leaders Milosevic and Tudjman ‘cleverly … appealed to the historical 
and cultural passions of their countrymen … to further their own political and regional 
ambitions’ (Daugherty 2004: 647). 
 
On the religious side, one can find many statements by religious leaders of rebellious 
groups stating essentially that God requires them to promote his will and to eliminate 
evil.   For example: 
 
•  ‘Our way is one of radical combat against depravity’
13; ‘The Resistance is not 
led by commanders. It is directed by the tenets of Islam’
14 (Spokespeople for 
the Hizbollah), 
•  ‘In order to preserve our Christian heritage and race, it is our patriotic duty to 
overthrow the Antichrist government’ (James Ellison, leader of a Christian 
Cult – the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, quoted in Stern 
2003: 18). Ellison told members that ‘Christians had turned away from old 
testament laws and were allowing enemies of Christ to rule the land’ (ibid: 
17). 
•  ‘It is our duty to defend the land for the sake of God’ (Palestinian leader, in 
interview with Stern, ibid: 39).  
•  ‘The resistance is not led by commanders. It is directed by the tenets of Islam’ 
(Lebanese cleric, quoted in Hoffman 2006: 91). 
 
                                                  
13 ‘Open Letter from the Party of God to the Disinherited of Lebanon and the 
World Revealing the Way and the Intentions which are their Own on the Occasion 
of the First Anniversary of Ragheb Harb, Symbol of the Islamic Resistance and 
Exemplary Martyr’, issued by Hezbollah, Beirut, Lebanon, February 6, 1985, quoted by Hoffman 
2006:91 
14 Quoted in Jaber (2007: 23). quoted by  Hoffman 2006: 91  
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The personal histories of many militant religious leaders indicate their devotion to the 
cause, and the limited personal rewards that some receive. Husain (2007) describes 
the career of Syed Qutb who became leader of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt after 
Hassan al-Bann was assassinated in 1949. He developed intellectual foundations for 
the movement (‘Milestones’) while imprisoned (and greatly maltreated) in Egypt: he 
was hanged for this in 1966.  
 
Many of the religious leaders come up from the ranks, starting as students and 
gradually rising to leadership positions – through their diligence and devotion. An 
example is Maulana Masood Azhar, a Pakistani, who started religious training when 
he was in his teens and spent six years in a radical seminary, graduating with 
distinction and becoming an imam; he joined the Harkat, a militant organisation, and 
was sent to a military training camp. He then opened a Harkat office and became a 
recruiter and fundraiser. He was imprisoned for a time by the Indian government, but 
was released under pressure from hijackers, after which he founded his own splinter 
group, recruiting volunteers for Jihads in Chechnya and Bosnia (Stern 2006: 194-5).  
While material rewards rose as he progressed (at least in terms of having body 
guards), they do not seem large, though there are undoubtedly more substantial status 
and psychological ones. The story seems to be fairly typical (Stern 2003).   
 
Another example is the leadership of Temple Mount Faithful, Jewish extremists 
whose aim was to destroy the Muslim Noble Sanctuary in Jerusalem in order to build 
the Third Temple on the site of the previous two Temples.  According to one of the 
leaders, Yoel Lerner, ‘the highest value for a Jew is not the preservation of human or 
even Jewish life. The highest value is doing what God wants you to do’ (ibid: 90).    
No material or political rewards were likely as a result of their activities. Indeed, 
Lerner spent some time in jail.  Similar stories can be told of militant Christian 
leaders.  
 
While both ethnic and religious leaders probably mostly use their respective identities 
instrumentally, for ethnic leaders this is possibly more often the prime motive. I say 
this for two reasons: first, because it appears that religious leaders typically emerge 
from a long personal history of religious devotion, while ethnic leaders seem 
sometimes to invent a belief in ethnic issues in order to assist them in power-seeking.  
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In other words, among religious leaders, the religion seems to come first and power-
seeking second, while the opposite seems to be true for ethnic leaders. And secondly, 
because the personal political rewards seem to be lower for religious leaders than for 
ethnic ones, though some religious leaders do gain status and some secure 
considerable economic rewards.  Yet there is a spectrum in the attitudes of both 
religious and ethnic leaders. Some religious leaders receive considerable political and 
material rewards
15; ‘Initially I was of the view that they are doing jihad, but now I 
believe that it is a business and people are earning wealth through it’ (Pakistan 
militant cited in Stern 2003: 216). And, on the ethnic side, Fashehum’s leadership 
emerged because he saw his group under threat and he did not gain great political 
rewards.    
 
In sum, it seems that as far as leadership is concerned, there is often a strong element 
of instrumentality in both ethnicity and religion, possibly more so in the case of 
ethnicity than of religion, with the relative strength of motives varying according to 
context.   
 
2.2.2 Motives of followers 
  
The situation as far as the mobilisees are concerned is different. Both religious and 
ethnic supporters generally ‘believe’ in their cause. But the cause is very different in 
the two cases. In the religious case, the cause is given divine sanction, and the 
supporters believe they are doing God’s will, supporting good and attacking evil, as is 
most evident in the case of suicide fighters.  
 
Rapoport (1984) describes three historic examples of religious terrorism – the Hindu 
Thugs – prevalent in India from at least the 13th to the 19th century who killed almost 
randomly in order to please the God Kali and were responsible for half a million or so 
deaths; the Muslim assassins, operating in Syria and Persia from 1090-1275 – whose 
targets were religious or political leaders who had betrayed Islam; and the Jewish 
Zealots-Sicarii, who had a much briefer (25-year) history and who assassinated Jews 
and non-Jews during the 1st century AD/CE, hoping to generate a mass uprising 
                                                  
15  According to one organiser of a militant Muslim group operating in Kashmir, the leaders live in 
mansions (Stern 2003: 213).  
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against the Romans and to produce a cataclysm which would result in the coming of 
the Messiah.  In each case, they had a transcendental purpose: in the case of the Thugs 
this was the entire purpose – to satisfy the requirements of Kali – and there seem to 
have been no contemporary political or economic objectives; in the case of the 
Assassins, while the aim was to purify Islam, there may have been some power 
motivation as well; in the case of the Zealots, the movement had both political and 
religious objectives but no material objectives, according to Rapoport.
16  
 
In each case, it appears that those who fought did so primarily because of their belief 
that this was God’s will and they would be rewarded by God’s approval, including in 
terms of their status in the afterlife.  
 
There is abundant evidence of a similar nature from contemporary religious fighters: 
 
•  The head of a Christian militia group in Maluku, Indonesia, ‘says that 
God made him a military commander. He saw Jesus Christ hovering 
over his head like a bird while he was in the midst of battle’ (Stern 
2003: 73).  
•   ‘What is there to be afraid of. I pray for death every day…If I die in 
the jihad, I go to paradise. Allah will reward me’ (member of Pakistani 
militant group, in interview with Stern, Stern 2003: 123).  
 
For religious mobilisees, pleasing God and enjoying the benefits that follow from this 
appear to provide a major motive, and along with this goes a belief that the fight is 
one of good against evil. Each religion teaches the inferiority of non-adherents and 
conflict leaders make systematic efforts to enforce the good-versus-evil message. For 
example,  
 
                                                  
16 For some reason Rapoport did not pick out a Christian group, but he clearly could have: for example, 
the Knights Templar, who were particularly active in the 11th and 12th centuries: ‘[A Templar Knight] 
is truly a fearless knight, and secure on every side, for his soul is protected by the armor of faith, just as 
his body is protected by the armor of steel. He is thus doubly-armed, and need fear neither demons nor 
men’. Bernard de Clairvaux, c. 1135, De Laude Novae Militae – In Praise of the New Knighthood, 
quoted in Wikipedia. In this case, there were not initially strong economic rewards. Many were killed 
in far-off lands in pursuit of their cause. Yet the movement as whole acquired considerable resources 




•  The Christian supremacists in the US describe how the ‘Zionist Occupied 
Government is killing our white babies through abortion. It is destroying white 
minds with its humanist teachings of evolution. In order to preserve our 
Christian heritage and race, it is our right to overthrow the antichrist 
government’ (Stern 2003: 18).  
•  ‘Our way is one of radical combat against depravity’ (a communiqué from a 
Lebanese Shi’a militant group, cited in Hoffman 2006: 89). 
•  Non-adherents are referred to by derogatory terms such as kaffir, goy, infidel. 
 
In addition, religious mobilisation, like ethnic, is often justified as being necessary 
defensively – to protect the religion against restrictions or suppression by others. For 
example, a leader of the Hezbollah in Lebanon stated that ‘Islam is a defensive 
movement against those who perform violence’ (cited in Hoffman 2006: 91).  Again 
as with ethnic mobilisation, material motives also play a part; supporters are often 
drawn from the unemployed, or those with very low incomes; while they may not 
receive large wages, they usually are supplied with their basic needs and with material 
and psychological security (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Stern 2003).  
 
While religion seems to provide a ready-made justification for dividing the world into 
good (believers) and evil (non-believers), it would seem more difficult to find such a 
justification for dividing ethnic groups in this way.  Drawing on social psychology, 
however, McCauley (2008) argues that identification with others is an intrinsic human 
characteristic and this forms the underlying psychological basis of adherence to 
ethnicity. He gives three reasons for the political power of ethnicity; people adhere to 
ethnic groups – those with similarities of various kinds – because they are ‘easier to 
see’, ethnic groups are then attributed an ‘essence’ (i.e. essentialised) which makes the 
divisions between the groups seem real, not constructed – this is more likely to occur 
the greater the ‘similarity, proximity and common fate’ which are seen as emanating 
from a common essence; finally, a person perceiving herself as a member of an ethnic 
group gains a sort of immortality, as the group goes on even if the individual doesn’t. 
This last makes members feel that it is particularly important to ensure the survival 
(and culture) of the group.  Religion can perform similar psychological functions 




If ethnic mobilisation is to be justified morally, it requires not only strong 
identification with the particular group, but a belief that it is justifiable to attack 
people outside the group. Such justification can and is generated in two ways: one is 
by leaders convincing followers that members of other groups are inferior or evil 
(‘rats’ as Hitler termed the Jews; ‘cockroaches, snakes’ etc. as the Hutu described the 
Tutsi); the other (complementary) way is to generate the belief that the other groups 
are going to attack the mobilisees’ own group, and survival (physical or cultural) 
depends on fighting them.  
 
The Hutu leadership in Rwanda followed both strategies. There was a long-standing 
‘theory’ of Tutsi conspiracy (‘the bahima conspiracy’ to kill off sufficient Hutu to 
ensure a Tutsi majority) (Hintjens 1999). In 1990, a journalist, Ngeze, published 
‘documents which purportedly “proved” that the Tutsi rebel movement was part of an 
ancient Tutsi-supremacist conspiracy to subjugate Hutus in feudal bondage’ 
(Gourevitch 1998: 86), listing Tutsi infiltration of public institutions. The article was 
financed by the government and distributed free to all mayors. In 1990 he published 
an article on ‘The Hutu Ten Commandments’: these included the proposition that all 
Tutsi women were agents and anyone who married one was a traitor; that every Tutsi 
was dishonest, and ‘his only aim is the supremacy of the ethnic group’; Hutus should 
control all positions of power and unite against the common Tutsi enemy, spread Hutu 
ideology and avoid showing mercy to Tutsis (Gourevitch 1998; Hintjens 1999). 
Rumours were spread of RPF
17 bombings of Kigali and plans to invade and kill all the 
Hutu elite (Hintjens 1999). In a famous speech in 1992, Leon Mugesera, a doctor and 
close friend of President Habyarimana and vice president of the MRND
18, stated that 
‘we the people are obliged to take responsibility ourselves to wipe out this scum’. He 
stated that ‘The law… mandated death to the “accomplices” of the “Cockroaches”’ 
(Gourevitch 1998: 96). ‘Massacres were invariably preceded by political 
“consciousness-raising” meetings at which local leaders, usually with a higher officer 
of the provincial or national government at their side, described Tutsis as devils – 
horns, hoofs and tails and all – and gave the order to kill them’ (ibid: 94).  
                                                  
17 Rwandan Patriotic Front, Tutsi rebels based in Uganda. 
18 Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement, the Hutu-dominated 




Leaders have to work at dehumanising the other, often preaching hate over many 
years, sometimes decades. Yet the audience frequently seems ready to receive the 
message – to believe that others are so inferior that their destruction is justified, often 
because of a long history of acculturation, and sometimes of conflict.  There is also 
plentiful evidence of material and psychological rewards for ethnic fighters, including 
wages, security and a variety of services (Guichaoua 2007; Iannaccone and Berman 
2006; Keen 1998; Keen and International Peace Academy 2005). But such rewards 
are not always present – for example, in the Rwandan slaughter. 
 
2.3 Organisation, training and support 
  
Effective mobilisation for conflict requires organisation, training and support, and 
these are generated by both religious and ethnic organisations.  
 
In formal religions, existing organisations centred on churches, mosques, synagogues 
or temples can be drawn on, though they may need to be taken over and their course 
changed from purely religious to more political functions. Husain (2007) provides a 
vivid case study of the way some mosques in London have been used in this way
19. 
New organisations may also emerge.   
 
In general, ethnic associations are less prevalent and may be formed for specific 
mobilisations. For example, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the rebellion of 19 
September 2002 led to the emergence of militant pro-government youth organisations, 
know as the Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes pour le Sursaut National or simply the 
Jeunes Patriots (Young Patriots). While the Young Patriots initially were able to 
mobilise a wide cross-section of the population in Abidjan they soon developed into 
urban militia forces under the control of the regime, consisting almost exclusively of 
people from the southwestern part of the country (i.e. the home region of President 
Laurent Gbagbo) (Marshall-Fratani 2006).
20 The formation of specialised ethnic 
associations may, indeed, be one of the early signs of impending mobilisation. In 
                                                  
19 Though it has been claimed that he is pursuing a political agenda and is not always accurate. Noman 
Hanif 2007. ‘Ex-Islamist Inc: Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism’. 
http://liberationparty.blogspot.com/2007/07/manufacturing-terrorism-case-against.html 
20 Also Arnim Langer, CRISE Research Officer, personal communication.  
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Rwanda, the militias developed out of local football clubs for children and 
associations of the unemployed (Reyntjens 1995, cited in Hintjens 1999). Among the 
most active of the killers, the interhammwe  apparently started as rural self-help 
associations, ‘much praised by donors’ (Hintjens 1999: 286).   
 
Training is one of the functions of such organisations. Where the state sponsors one 
side, this is provided officially or semi-officially (as in Sudan; Cote d’Ivoire; Rwanda 
– Hintjens 1999). Rebels may be trained with overseas support; in the Cold War this 
was supplied by one side or other. For example, as is well known, the Taliban initially 
received training and supplies from the U.S., while rebels in Central America received 
support from the USSR and Cuba.  Post-Cold war, it seems that religious 
organisations are in a stronger position than ethnic ones to secure external support. 
Islamic organisations receive financial support from Middle Eastern countries and 
some from European countries, and there is also international support for training. 
(Stern 2003; Hoffman 2006).  In central Nigeria, Christians received supported from 
the US and Muslims from the Middle East (Last 2007).  Within a country, support 
also comes from co-religionists (Diprose forthcoming). Ethnic groups generally have 
a narrower basis for support; however, where there is a big diaspora this can produce 
significant support, such as from the Tamils to the Sri Lankan LTTE.  Moreover, 
some ethnic groups have ties to particular Western governments (e.g. the Hutus to 
France), which can lead to financial and technical assistance and arms.   
 
Contrasting three minority separatist movements in Southeast Asia, May (1992) found 
that Islamic identity provided a source of both financial and political support in 
Thailand, among the Patani, and for the Moro in the Philippines. In contrast, however, 
although the struggle was one of Christians versus others, Christianity did not provide 
a unifying identity in West Papua, Indonesia, as the struggles were presented in 
cultural not religious terms and only limited Christian support was provided. They 
received only ‘sympathy and occasional moral support’ from Irianese emigrants and 
from a variety of human rights groups. (May 1992: 409).  
 
Preliminary conclusions, then, are that religious groups have more ready-made 
organisational structures, while ethnic groups have to work harder at creating them.  
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And, for the most part, religious groups are likely to find it easier to get outside 
support than ethnic groups. 
 
3. Implications for the nature of conflicts 
 
Here I shall consider two questions: 
 
1. Are there reasons to expect more religious than ethnic conflicts, for a given socio-
economic situation?  
2. Are there reasons to expect the conflicts to be ‘worse’ – i.e. to last longer and 
involve more deaths and destruction?  
 
1. Are there reasons to expect more religious than ethnic conflicts, for a given socio-
economic situation?  
 
There are many more ethnicities than religions in the world, even allowing for 
religious sects, so there would seem to be more potential for ethnic than religious 
conflict.  But only a very small proportion of potential ethnic conflicts (taking all 
situations where ethnicities live side-by-side as potential) turn into actual conflicts 
(Fearon and Laitin 1996), so a higher conversion rate for religious conflicts (from 
potential to actual) could compensate for this. There are reasons for expecting a 
higher conversion rate – the ready-made organisational apparatus religions have, the 
impact of divine sanction on mobilisation, and the external support available – all of 
which might generate more religious than ethnic conflict.   On the other hand, the 
political and material gains for participants may be less, and there are many situations 
where there are no significant religious differences so any conflict is bound to be 
ethnic or geographic.  
 
External events and the global habitus play a role too, so one might expect a change in 
the balance of religious as against ethnic conflicts over time in the light of such global 
changes.  To summarise very large changes very briefly, there have been many major 
changes in the global context which affect the nature of salient identities and their use 
for mobilisation. Among the relevant changes are the nationalist movements of 19th-
century Europe and colonial societies in both 19th and 20th centuries; the emergence  
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and then the collapse of socialism as an ideal; a general move in the intellectual ethos 
from the enlightenment and modernism to post-modernism, and along with this a 
reaction against prevailing secularism towards religious and ethnic revival.  Increased 
global and national communications associated with modern technology have been 
argued to increase ethnic awareness (Connor 1972). It has also been widely argued, as 
noted earlier, that the end of the Cold War brought less emphasis on ideology and 
class and more on ethnicity and religion (especially by Huntington 1996, 2002). The 
nationalist ideology had mixed implications for the role of ethnicity. On the one hand, 
nationalist movements typically struggled to develop national identities, subsuming or 
eliminating local identities. On the other, the same philosophy that justified 
nationalism could also justify sub-national ‘nationalisms’ (Connor 1972)
21. Moreover, 
the suppression of subnational identities left an undergrowth of ethnicities, ready to be 
revived when conditions became ripe, as we see clearly in the case of the former 
Yugoslavia. Finally, the worldwide religious revival, itself partly a reaction to the 
secular material culture embodied in Western capitalism, as well as to the sharp 
horizontal inequalities between and within countries in which Muslims are 
systematically relatively deprived (Stewart 2008a), was a cause (as well as a 
consequence) of religious mobilisation, providing a global network of support for 
those who led religious groups. 
 
Reynal-Querol has argued that, ceteris paribus, there are likely to be more religious 
than ethnic conflicts: ‘religiously divided societies are more prone to intense conflict 
than countries where people have conflicting claims to resources based on interest 
groups or language divisions… because religious identity is fixed and non-negotiable. 
Disputes among identity groups based on their religion are particularly difficult to 
negotiate, raising the odds of violence’ (Reynal-Querol 2002: 29).  She states that 
religious differences are sharper, firstly because the identity is exclusive: a person can 
be half-French and half-Saudi but not half-Muslim, half-Christian; a person can have 
two languages but only one religion. And secondly, because religious differences 
imply different ways of understanding the world.  But counter-arguments are possible: 
religious conversion is possible, whereas ethnic conversion is usually not; and ethnic 
                                                  
21 ‘…in its pristine form, the doctrine [‘self-determination of nations’] makes ethnicity the ultimate 
measure of political legitimacy, by holding that any self-differentiating people, simply because it is a 
people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself’ (Connor 1972: 331).  
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differences, too, may imply different ways of seeing the world. In fact, there is a large 
amount of common perceptions and beliefs in the great religions.  
 
Reynal-Querol (2002) provides empirical results supporting her view that religious 
differences (measured as religious polarisation) tend to be associated with a higher 
incidence of conflict than ethnic differences (measured by linguistic differences), 
while fractionalisation of either kind has not effect.  However, the findings of 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) differ: they find ethnic polarisation consistently 
raises the risk of conflict, but religious polarisation only does so (positively) when 
religious fractionalisation (which has a negative sign) is also included. They cite the 
contrast between Korea and Sri Lanka as examples.  They argue that this is because 
higher religious fractionalisation increases coordination problems.  While both studies 
take into account many of the usual factors associated with conflict (per capita 
income, level of education, population size, the share of primary exports), they do not 
include socio-economic horizontal inequality. However, Reynal-Querol (2002) does 
have a measure for political inclusiveness (assessed by the type of political system), 
and she finds that more inclusive democracies (which presumably are ones with lower 
political horizontal inequalities) reduce the propensity for religiously polarised 
societies to have civil war. 
 
In summary, then, it is not possible to answer the question a priori and the limited 
empirical evidence is ambiguous. It seems that conflicts are organised along ethnic or 
religious lines broadly according to the effectiveness of so doing from the point of 
view of mobilising support of both people and finance. It was argued earlier that this 
is likely to vary according to the nature of horizontal inequalities among groups (or 
potential grievances) and to the demographics of the situation. For example, in the 
cases cited earlier in Southeast Asia, Islam provided a unifying identity in both 
Thailand and the Philippines, whereas multiple ethnicities meant this would have been 
less effective (May 1992a).  
 
2. Are there reasons to expect religious or ethnic conflicts to be ‘worse’ – i.e. to 




Reynal-Querol claims that religious conflicts are likely to be fiercer and on a larger 
scale than ethnic ones. Grew also argues that ‘religious beliefs have always been those 
that people were most willing to sacrifice, fight, and die – and live – for’ (Grew 1997: 
20, cited in Nordäs 2007). Equally, Hoffman argues that religious conflicts result in 
many more deaths than other types – although he is writing about ‘terrorist incidents’ 
rather than all conflicts. His reasons are, first, the transcendental nature of such 
conflicts – as noted earlier he claims that ‘its perpetrators ... often disregard the 
political moral, or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists’ (Hoffman 
2006: 88).  He argues that religious terrorists ‘often seek the elimination of broadly 
defined categories of enemies’ whereas secular terrorists ‘rarely attempt 
indiscriminate killing on a truly massive scale because such tactics are not consonant 
with their political aims’ (ibid). Finally, he argues that secular terrorists aim to correct 
a ‘flaw’ in a basically good system or ‘as a means to foment the creation of a new 
system’ but religious terrorists ‘seek fundamental changes…This sense of alienation 
also enables the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive and deadly 
types of terrorism’ (ibid: 89).   
 
Hoffman present two types of evidence for his view that religious conflicts are more 
deadly: first, a list of terrorist incidents between 1992 and 1998 which he claims show 
that ‘terrorism motivated in whole or in part by religious imperatives has often led to 
more intense acts of violence that have produced considerably higher levels of 
fatalities than the relatively more discriminating and less lethal incidents of terrorist 
violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organisations’ (ibid: 88).  And secondly, he 
notes that the proportion of total terrorist deaths accounted for by Shi’a terrorists in 
the 1980s and al Qaeda from 1998-2004 far exceed the proportion of incidents.  Yet 
Lacina (2006) finds no evidence that the total battle deaths in civil wars, 1946-2002, 
were significantly more, the greater either religious or ethnic polarisation.  
 
Moving from what Hoffman defines as terrorism, to the worst incidents of mass 
killings, an overview of cases with very high death rates (with 200,000 or more 
deaths) since 1956 shows ethnic incidents of these mass lethal events being far the 
most pervasive; there is no single case of religion alone, but religion combined with 
ethnicity/nationality played a role in four cases out of the 16 (Table 1). The very worst 
cases – over 1 million deaths – include four with no religious element (Pakistan,  
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Cambodia, Rwanda, the Congo) and three with some religious motivation (Bosnia, 
Sudan and Iraq/Iran). These facts make nonsense of Hoffman’s claims about the 
‘moral or practical constraints’ of non-religious fighters. 
 
Table 1: Large-scale killing episodes, accounting for 200,000 deaths or more, 
since 1956 
Country  Date  Est. killed  Nature of killing 
Sudan 1956-72  400-600,000  Ethnic  and 
religious 
South Vietnam  1965-75  400-500,000  Ideology 
Indonesia  1965-66  500-1,000,000  Ideology and ethnic
China 1965-75  400-850,000  Ideology 
Guatemala 1978-96  60-200,000  Ethnic  and 
ideology 
Pakistan 1971  1,000-3,000,000  Political 
Uganda  1972-79  50-400,000  Ethnic and political 
Angola 1975-2001  500,000  Ethnic  and 
ideology 
Cambodia  1975-79  1,900 -3,500,000  Ethnic and class 
Afghanistan 1978-92  1,800,000  Ideology 
Uganda  1980-1986  200-500,000  Ethnic and political 
Sudan 1983+ 2,000,000+  Ethnic  and 
religious 
Iraq/Iran war  1980-88  438-1,300,000  Religion and 
nationalism 
Bosnia 1992-95  225,000  Ethnic  and 
religious 
Rwanda 1994  500-1,000,000  Ethnic 
Congo  1998-2004  5,400,000  Ethnic and political 
Source: Harff (2003), apart from Congo: IRC (http://www.theirc.org/special-
report/congo-forgotten-crisis.html?gclid=CIT44_Gs4ZcCFUoa3godghl2CQ); and 




On this evidence, it would seem that of large-scale events over these years, ethnic 
conflicts were the deadlier. 
 
4. What can we learn from CRISE perceptions surveys on these issues? 
 
CRISE perceptions surveys allow further investigation of one important issue 
considered above: what determines the nature of mobilisation – whether it is 
according to religion or ethnicity, where both present possibilities. In four countries 
surveyed – Ghana, Nigeria, Indonesia and Malaysia – there are both religious and 
ethnic divisions, and political mobilisation might potentially be rooted in either 
identity. There are also quite severe socio-economic and political horizontal 
inequalities in each country, whether assessed by ethnic group or by religion 
(evidence is provided by Langer et al. 2007; Mustapha 2005; Sundaram 2001; Khoo 
2001). Around 600 questionnaires were administered in two or three sites in each 
country.  
 
The religious composition of the sample in each country is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Religious composition of respondents

















































As can be seen from Figure 1, there is considerable variation in religious composition 
across countries and among areas within each country
22. Ghana is predominantly 
Christian in all areas, but with significant Muslim minorities, except in Ho; the other 
three countries are more mixed. Two of the sites in Nigeria were mainly Christian but 
with substantial Muslim minorities, while one was almost entirely Muslim (Lagos-
Ajegunle); in Malaysia all three areas were mixed, between Muslims and (mainly) 
Buddhists, but with significant Hindu minorities and some Christians. The Indonesian 
sites were fairly evenly divided between Hindus and Muslims. Ho in Ghana and 
Kukawa in Nigeria are virtually homogeneous religiously, one Christian the other 
Muslim. 
 
Turning to ethnic composition (Figures 2a-2e), in the two West African countries 
there were four major groups – Akan, Ewe, Ga-Adangme and Mole-Dagbani in 
Ghana, with Akan dominating the sample as a whole (at over 50 per cent); and 
Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani and Kanuri in Nigeria, with Yoruba dominating at 41 per 
cent; and three in Malaysia – Chinese, Malay and Indian – with Malays the largest 
group (at 45 per cent). The Indonesian sites stood out in this respect: each had four 
largish groups and then numerous small ones (32 different identities were identified 
altogether). Two of Ghana’s three survey sites were dominated by one group – Akan 
in Kumasi who formed 78 per cent of respondents and Ewe in Ho, who formed 80 per 
cent – while the other site was much more mixed. In Nigeria, just one site was 
dominated by a single group – Lagos-island with 87 per cent Yoruba – and the other 
two sites were mixed. In Malaysia and Indonesia each of the sites had a fair balance of 




                                                  
22 The data are derived from respondents’ own answers to the question of what their religious affiliation 
and ethnic group was.  
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Figure 2: Ethnic composition of respondents 
 
Figure 2a: Ghana: ethnic composition










Figure 2b: Nigeria ethnic composition
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Figure 2c: Malaysia ethnic composition























The sample was not intended to be nationally representative, and the data on both 
religion and ethnicity indicates that indeed it is not: Muslims form a much higher 
proportion of the national population in Malaysia, Indonesia and Ghana than in the 
sample. In terms of ethnicity, Malays form a much larger proportion of the total 
Malaysian population than the 45 per cent of our sample (about two-thirds, including 
all ‘sons of the soil’); in Ghana, the Akan, Ewe and Ga-Adangme are overrepresented 
and the Mole-Dagbani underrepresented compared with national estimate; in Nigeria, 
likewise, some are overrepresented (Yoruba, Ewe and Kanuri) and some 
underrepresented (Hausa-Fulani); and in Indonesia, the Javanese are seriously  
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underrepresented and the Bugis overrepresented. None of this is surprising given the 
choice of sites and the fact that different ethnicities are regionally concentrated. 
 
A series of questions provided indications of the relative salience of religion and 
ethnicity as identities.  Respondents reported that religion was a very important aspect 
of their identity everywhere (Figure 3).  Over 70  per cent of the sample put this as 
one of their three most important identities in Ghana, Nigeria and Malaysia. Only in 
Indonesia, did it fall to just under 50 per cent. Ethnicity was mentioned by 
substantially fewer people than religion in West Africa; and by fewer in Southeast 
Asia, except for Poso in Indonesia, where it was mentioned by slightly more people 
than religion. Since people may have felt that saying that their language or region of 
origin was important was equivalent to saying ethnicity was important we devised a 
measure of ‘broad ethnicity’ which included all respondents who mentioned either 
ethnicity or language or region of origin.
23 With this broad definition, ethnicity was 
mentioned by more people than religion in Lagos-Ajengunle, Penang and both sites in 
Indonesia – but still by fewer people in all the Ghana sites, two of the Nigeria sites 
and one of the Malaysian ones.  For the purpose of analysing mobilisation, the narrow 
definition seems more relevant, however, as it indicates that it was ethnicity as such 
that people immediately thought of as significant. 
 
                                                  
23 If they mentioned more than one of these, they were counted just once as mentioning broad ethnicity.  
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Religion was a more important identity for those who were Muslim than those who 
were Christian, Hindu or Buddhist. It was one of the three most important identities 
for 89 per cent of Nigerian Muslims, 92 per cent of Ghanaian Muslims, 63 per cent of 
Indonesian Muslims and 94 per cent of Malaysian Muslims, whereas for Christians 
the proportion saying religion was among the three most important aspects of their 
identity was 60 per cent, 65 per cent and 35 per cent for Nigeria, Ghana and Indonesia 
respectively.  
 
A further indication of the personal importance of religion was that the rate of 
marriages across religions was less than the rate of marriages across ethnicity in all 
countries except Malaysia, where both were very low (2.1 per cent across ethnicity; 
2.5 per cent across religion). In Ghana there were 25 per cent cross-ethnic marriages, 
but just 10 per cent across religion (which may well have included marriages across 
different types of Christianity as well as between Christians and Muslims), and in 
Nigeria, 10 per cent and 5 per cent respectively.  Consistent with this finding, 
objections to cross-religious marriages substantially outweighed objections to cross-
ethnic marriages in almost all places (Figure 4). The one exception was Malaysia,  
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where objections to interethnic marriage were almost as great as objections to 
interreligious marriages. 
 
From this data, one might expect religious mobilisation rather than ethnic in these 
countries. Yet other data tell a different story. 
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In many respects there was little difference between religious and ethnic identity. For 
example, in three countries (Ghana, Nigeria and Indonesia) there were more social 
contacts within the religious group than within the ethnic group but the opposite was 
true in Malaysia (Table 2). The striking fact is the very high proportion of ‘in-group’ 
contacts, whether religious or ethnic. However, this was clearly a function of where 
people lived; in Ho for example which is almost entirely Christian it is unavoidable 
that most social contact would be among Christians. In addition, in all countries the 
great majority had no problems about working with others from different ethnic or 
religious groups and there was little difference between cross-ethnic and cross-
religious work situations (Table 3). The highest proportions of people who were not 
comfortable working with others were in Kukawa in Nigeria (which is a totally 
Muslim area), with respect to religion.  
 




 Ghana*  Nigeria  Indonesia Malaysia
Ethnic group  87.7  63.3  61.8  83.7 
Religious 
group 
95.5 70.9  76.0  78.7 
 
*This question was asked rather differently in Ghana, so comparison across countries 






      Table 3: % not comfortable working with other groups 
 
When asked whether their views of other religions/ethnic groups had improved or 
worsened, the vast majority said they had either improved or remained unchanged, 
with similar proportions in relation to religion and ethnicity.  Again, Malaysian 
respondents stood out with significantly higher proportions saying that their view 
of other religious or ethnic groups had worsened, but with little difference as 
between the ethnic or religious classification.  
 
Figure 5: Net change in the salience of identity















































However, when asked whether the salience of ethnicity/religion had changed in 
recent years, there were marked differences across locations (Figure 5). In both 
Nigeria and Malaysia, many more people thought the salience of both religion and 
ethnicity had increased, with more pointing to ethnicity in Nigeria and more to 
 Ghana Nigeria  Malaysia  Indonesia 




Kukawa Penang Kuantan Donggala Posso
Ethnic 
group 
2.6 0  1.2 2.5 1.0  4.5  6.7 11.8  1.0  1.3 
Religious 
group 
3.3 3.3  1.7  4.6  2.5  19  5.5  12.2  1.3  5.0  
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religion in Malaysia. In the other two countries, different results obtained 
according to location. In each case, a high proportion of respondents in one 
location (Ho in Ghana; Posso in Indonesia) felt that the salience of identities had 
increased, with respect to religion but not ethnicity in the case of Posso, and 
predominantly ethnicity in the case of Ho.  
 
However, a more systematic difference emerged in relation to whether people 
perceived that ethnicity and religion affected their chances of getting job, 
contracts, education etc. (Figure 6). In general, people perceived ethnicity as more 
important than religion in the allocation of government and private sector jobs, 
contracts and services, with the most marked differences between the two in 
Nigeria and Malaysia – the two countries where policies do indeed allocate 
government jobs and contracts to some extent according to ethnicity. But even in 
Ghana and Indonesia, where there is no explicit policy in this respect, more people 
think government jobs and contracts are allocated according to ethnicity than by 
religion. In Ghana 35 per cent and in Indonesia 28 per cent overall believe 
government jobs are allocated according to ethnicity. Housing is another area 
where there is a strong perception that background affects chances, especially in 
Ghana and Malaysia. People across the board think that getting access to 
education and public services is less affected by background, but again ethnic 
background is regarded as more relevant than religious.  Once again Posso stands 
out: it is the one area where religion is regarded as a more important factor 
influencing chances than ethnicity. 
  
If one differentiates among respondents according to their own ethnic or religious 
background, one finds (not unexpectedly) that it is ‘opposition’ groups that are 
more negative about other groups, and are more likely to state that their chances 
are affected by their background. For example, 49 per cent of Ewe in Ghana (then 
broadly the opposition group) believed that the salience of ethnicity had increased, 
but only 19 per cent of Akan (the group which dominated the government) 
thought this; and 49% of Ewe thought ethnic background affected the chance of 
getting government jobs, compared with 29% of Akan.  Similarly, substantially 
more Yoruba and Igbo in Nigeria thought ethnicity affected chances than the more 
politically dominant Hausa-Fulani.  In Malaysia, a very high proportion of those  
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of Chinese or Indian origin (over 70 per cent) thought the government favoured 
certain groups compared with 31 per cent of Malays. 
 





















Ethnic Private sector jobs
Religion Government jobs
Religion Government contracts
Religion  Private sector jobs
 
 
Where ethnicity is perceived to count more than religion in governmental 
allocation of economic and social benefits, one might expect ethnicity to play a 
more political role, including in terms of conflict mobilisation, despite the fact 
that religion seems more important in people’s own view of themselves.  
 
Responses on voting patterns allow further investigation of this issue.  Asked 
whether they would vote for candidates from different groups, every group 
showed a preference for their own group as against others and prejudice against 
particular groups. In West Africa, the ethnic voting preferences and prejudices 
seemed to be stronger than religious ones, but in Southeast Asia, religious 
prejudice – particularly by Christians against voting for Muslims – were 
somewhat stronger than the ethnic prejudices.  This is consistent with the 
differences in views about allocation of jobs etc. In more detail:  
 
•  In Ghana, ethnic voting showed up in the tendency for the Akan and the 
Mole-Dagbani not to vote for the Ewe; there was no apparent religious 
discrimination, but Muslims were more likely to favour other Muslims.   
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•  In Nigeria, ethnic voting preferences seemed to be stronger, particularly 
with the Yoruba and Igbo against the Northern Hausa-Fulani, and the 
Hausa-Fulani against the Yoruba, plus a strong preference for their own 
group among the Yoruba, Igbo and Fulani.  Religious discrimination or 
favouritism was mild among Muslims, but strong (against Muslims) 
among Christians, although no stronger than the ethnic prejudice of the 
Yoruba. 
•  In Indonesia, there was some ethnic preference and prejudice, but the 
strongest prejudice was shown by Christians against Muslims. 
•  Malaysia showed the strongest racial and religious preferences and 
prejudices: while the Malays (and Muslims) showed only mild racial or 
religious voting preferences, there was a strong anti-Malay and anti-Islam 
preference expressed by both the Chinese and Indians. The data indicates 
that religious prejudices were larger than racial ones.  
 
Table 4: Proportion who would vote for a particular group compared with their 
overall voting ratio 
 
4a: Ghana  Akan Ewe Mole-
Dagbani 
Christian Islam 
Akan 1.046  0.843  1.002     
Ewe 0.977  1.060  0.992     
Mole-
Dagbani 
1.001 0.930 1.062     
Christian       0.994  0.999 
Muslim       0.987  1.147 
       
4b. Nigeria  Yoruba Igbo Hausa-
Fulani 
Christian Islam 
Yoruba 1.322  1.137  0.657     
Igbo 1.061  1.789  0.640     
Hausa 0.899  1.048  1.156     
Fulani 0.801  1.003  1.296      
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Christian       1.379  0.747 
Muslim       0.923  1.123 





Javanese Islam Christian 
Pamona 1.097  0.814  0.910     
Kaili 0.852  1.026  1.009     
Gorontalo 0.881  0.954  1.044     
Minahasa 1.011  0.837  1.010     
Bugis  0.843      
Javanese 0.878  0.921  1.069     
Balinese 0.984  0.838  0.936     
Islam       1.029  0.964 
Christian       0.740  1.095 
 
4d. Malaysia  Malay Chinese Indian  Islam Buddhist Hindu 
Malay  1.080 0.903 1.029       
Chinese  0.603 1.307 1.281       
Indian  0.625 1.257 1.419       
Muslim      1.078  0.892  1.055 
Christian      0.517  1.385  1.363 
Buddhist      0.547  1.382  1.292 
Hindu      0.573  1.284  1.499 
 
Voting intentions tell us about one aspect of (non-violent) mobilisation. In order to try 
and assess propensity to violent mobilisation, respondents were asked a series of 
questions about their attitudes to violence. Almost all agreed that ‘violence should 
never be used’. However, as shown below (Figure 7) a substantial proportion also 
agreed that ‘sometimes violence is the only way to be heard’.   
 
It is of interest that ‘peaceful’ Ghana shows among the highest agreement with this 
statement, and Nigeria, which has suffered periodically from violence, the least 
agreement – which could be a consequence of having seen the results of violence or  
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part of a ‘politically correct’ response. We find no systematic differences between the 
attitudes of those who mention religion as one of their three most important identities 
and those who mention ethnicity, though we do find the highest approval among those 
mentioning religion in Posso where there has been religious violence. 
 
 
Figure 7: % agreeing that sometimes violence is the only 

























































































From this evidence one would expect more ethnic mobilisation in West Africa,but that 
in Southeast Asia religious mobilisation, especially by Christians against Muslims, 
might be more prevalent. This is broadly supported by events. In Ghana, there has 
been no serious violent mobilisation at a national level
24, but political parties and 
voting patterns broadly follow ethnic lines (Langer 2009). In Nigeria, at a national 
level, there is broad ethnic voting, although the strong overlap between ethnicity and 
religion makes it difficult to differentiate the two (Afro-barometer surveys; Oyediran 
1979; Aborisade and Mundt 2001). Moreover, as noted earlier, the militia 
                                                  
24 With the exception of the ‘guinea fowl war’ in Northern Ghana,1994-5 (see Jönsson 2007).   
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organisations are organised on ethnic lines. In terms of violent events, the Biafran war 
had an ethnic and regional, not a religious, basis, while violence in the Niger Delta is 
led by local ethnic groups, protesting about the way the oil resources are used – it has 
no religious basis.  In Kano and the Middle Belt, however, violent conflicts have been 
organised along three tightly overlapping dimensions (settlers and indigenes, and 
ethnic and religious differences, with religion dominating as the organising element). 
These areas were not covered by the surveys cited above. But a similar survey was 
conducted in Kano, where there was serious violent conflict in 2004 (Ehrhardt 2007 
and personal communication from David Ehrhardt); it showed, first, that (as with the 
other surveys), religion was by far the most salient identity, declared by over 90 per 
cent of respondents to be one of their most important identities, while language (taken 
as a proxy for ethnicity) was included by just over 40 per cent. But in contrast to the 
Nigerian surveys cited above (Figure 6), religion was viewed as a more important 
factor absolutely and relative to ethnicity in political allocations. For example, in 
Kano City, in 2006, 51 per cent thought religion affected the chances of getting a 
government job, compared with 59 per cent who thought ethnicity did. By 2008, there 
was a much less marked view that there was government favouritism in either 
dimension, but religious favouritism outpaced ethnic, at 31 per cent compared with 23 
per cent.   
 
Turning to Southeast Asia, in Posso, the violent conflict did have strong religious 
dimensions (Brown 1994; Brown et al. 2005). This is consistent with the exceptional 
results for Posso in our survey, which indicated that people felt religious background 
was more important than ethnic in determining jobs, contracts etc, in contrast to all 
other areas surveyed. Since our survey, however, followed the violence (as did the 
Kano survey), the results, in each case, could be the outcome of this violence, not its 
cause. In Malaysia, where respondents gave ethnicity as most important, but religion 
as almost as important as ethnicity in one area, and also important for over 30 per cent 
of respondents in the other, in the allocation of government jobs and contracts (Figure 
6), political mobilisation has followed strongly overlapping religious and ethnic 
dimensions (Brown 1994; Sundaram 2001; Khoo 2001). 
 
Earlier, it was hypothesised that the demographic situation might also affect the way 
people mobilise. This too receives some support from these surveys, since the  
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Indonesian sites show many more ethnic identities than elsewhere, whereas religious 
identities are virtually bimodal (Figures 1, 2d and 2e).  
  
In conclusion, the evidence from these surveys suggests that it is not the identity that 
is most important to people from a personal perspective that necessarily forms the 
basis of mobilisation. Rather it is the one that it is perceived as being important from 
the point of view of the allocation of government resources. This supports the view 
that the identity that is adopted is determined largely instrumentally, and is a matter of 
resources and politics, rather than a matter of deep primordial beliefs. But the 
existence of strong identities provides the context in which such identities can be used 




The paper has explored differences and similarities between the use of religion and 
ethnicity as mobilising identities, both by drawing on existing literature and by 
analysing some results of surveys of perceptions in four multiethnic and 
multireligious countries. The review in the first three sections of this paper suggested 
both similarities and differences in how ethnicity and religion ‘work’ in terms of 
mobilising people for conflict.  The paper takes the view that while the underlying 
causes of conflict generally arise from a combination of conflicts over control of 
resources and resentments about state failures and horizontal inequalities, in most 
conflicts shared identities among those who fight or support the fighting are important 
as a way of unifying and motivating people and of creating trust among participants. 
Both religious and ethnic identities play this role. In many conflicts, indeed, where 
there are overlapping religious and ethnic identities, each may reinforce the other, and 
it is not always clear which is the dominant one, and this can change over time. But in 
other conflicts, one or the other identity is clearly dominant. Both identities work 
instrumentally, with leaders using the identity to differentiate their supporters from 
others, and to identify the others as evil and inferior.  
 
There do seem to be some differences, however. First, while both identities are clearly 
used instrumentally by leaders to mobilise people, historical analysis and interviews 
suggest that religious leaders have a stronger belief in their cause than ethnic leaders,  
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and that the latter primarily use rather than believe in the identities. Secondly, both 
types of leader need to convince followers of the importance of the cause and the 
righteousness of killing for it. In both cases, this needs considerable work, which may 
be carried out over a long historical period preceding violence.  This work consists in 
preaching the inferiority of the other and, importantly, that the other threatens the 
group, convincing people, often by invented incidents, that preservation of the group 
requires an attack on the other. In the case of religion, texts can be interpreted or 
reinterpreted to achieve this objective. In the case of ethnicity, there is generally no 
such text to be called on, and here specific works have to be produced, and 
promulgated by speeches and the media. Religion generally has an organisational 
advantage, with existing religious organisations ready made, but they need conversion 
towards a mobilising objective; ethnic associations also often exist historically, but 
may be less formal or may need to be formed.  Religious movements may also find it 
easier to call on outside resources, from others sharing the religion. However, outside 
support comes for some ethnic wars, from the same or similar groups (as in the 
Congo) or from external powers seeking to improve their own position.  
 
Participants (called ‘followers’ here) often have material and political motives, but in 
both cases, they also appear to have strong primordial beliefs in their essential 
differences. In particular cases, this seems to be the result of a history of competition, 
conflict and propaganda, with education (parental, informal and formal) playing a 
major role.  Yet it seems people are surprisingly easy to convince about their 
‘essential’ differences, possibly because of a deep human need to belong. 
 
Although some authors have predicted that religion is likely to lead to more, and more 
deadly, conflicts than ethnicity, this is not supported by the (limited) evidence. 
Indeed, there have been more very large-scale episodes associated with ethnicity than 
with religion over the past 60 years.   
 
In many situations where groups differ in both religion and in ethnicity, there is some 
‘choice’ as to which is used for mobilisation.  The paper has suggested that two 
factors influence which is chosen: first, which identity is used (or believed to be used) 
politically in the allocation of resources; and secondly, what the demographic 
situation is, with the mobilising identity being one that unites a large and effective  
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group. The survey material supported the first view, showing that mobilisation 
occurred behind the identity which was thought to affect people’s material chances of 
securing government jobs, contracts etc., rather than behind the identity that appeared 
to mean most to the people.  It also lent some support to the second hypothesis since 
religious identity was used for conflict in Posso, where there were multiple ethnic 
identities. However, the Posso story is also consistent with the first explanation.   
 
Some policy implications for conflict prevention follow from the analysis and 
conclusions of this paper. The first priority remains the need to correct the root causes 
– i.e. the inequalities, unemployment, poverty and mismanagement of natural 
resources that so often underlie conflicts. It is the existence of these that lead to the 
politicisation of identities. But beyond that, the paper suggests that there could be a 
role for policy in breaking the links between underlying root causes and actual 
mobilisation. These links include the creation and accentuation of identities of a group 
itself and of others; and the organisation, training and financing of those who fight. 
These are real events which take place over a long time; the first occur via education, 
writing, the media etc, in a process which Akindès calls ‘the marketing of 
identities’(Akindès 2007). The second generally take place in a shorter time period, 
but are more palpable and easier to detect.  
 
Preventative policy, both by outsiders and by local decision-makers, including central 
and local governments and civil society, includes in-depth monitoring of 
developments and then developing offsetting action. In most conflicts, both religious 
and ethnic, there are many warning signs, often recorded by independent observers, 
frequently ignored by decision-makers for a variety of reasons. One is that the 
government itself is often deeply implicated.  The processes are similar for religious 
and ethnic conflicts, but the location and precise nature of conflict-creating activities 
differ. One major difference in transmission mechanisms between religious and ethnic 
conflicts is the role of external agents in all aspects of conflict creation – that of 
formation of salient identities, and the provision of a variety of types of support. As 
noted above, both may have external support, but religious groups tend to have more 
extensive ones. The external link gives a potential role for outsiders in breaking some 
parts of the transmission process – as occurred for example, in relation to US Irish 




This paper is based on incomplete evidence. It thus presents a research agenda, rather 
than definitive conclusions. Research questions that need further work, include: 
 
1.  What is the statistical evidence on the prevalence of religious, ethnic or 
ideological conflicts, and conflicts which ‘combine’ more than one 
element over time? 
2.  Is there evidence that for the same socio-economic and political causes, 
there are more or fewer religious or ethnic conflicts? 
3.  Is there statistical evidence for the conflicts differing in terms of intensity 
(length; number of deaths)?   
4.  Is there evidence of differences in external support according to the nature 
of the conflict?  
5.  Can one discern leaders’  ‘true’ motivations: the balance of 
identity/ideology, and instrumental reasons and material reasons? 
6.  Can one discern the balance of reasons (notably identity/ideology and 
material) for followers? 
7.  How does the rhetoric and ‘selling’ of the mobilisation identity differ 
between religious and ethnic mobilisation, with respect to own identity and 
that of the other? 
8.  How do successful and unsuccessful peacemaking efforts differ? 
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